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In this Article, I return to an inquiry I joined in Love and Power.1
Should we Americans accept an ideal of political choice according to
which a citizen ought not make a controversial political choice - a
choice that some fellow citizens oppose - if the choice cannot be
defended without relying on a religious belief that at least some op-
ponents of the choice reject? That is, should we accept it as an
American ideal: an ideal for us Americans?2
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1. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MO-
RALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991).
2. Let us assume, for present purposes, that some controversial political choices
cannot be defended without relying on a religious belief that (some) opponents of the
I have suggested in Love and Power what it means to say that a
belief is "religious." 3 For present purposes, it suffices to say that by a
"religious" belief, I mean a belief whose content is at least partly
religious: for example, a belief that God commands us to do some-
thing, or a belief that the cosmos is, or a belief about how it is,
ultimately meaningful.
I. WHAT ROLE SHOULD RELIGIOUS MORALITY PLAY, IF ANY, IN
POLITICAL CHOICE?
Experience has taught me that the question of the role religious
morality should play in political choice is extraordinarily vulnerable
to misunderstanding. I want to begin, therefore, by clarifying the
question.
The question is not whether a citizen may rely on a religious belief
in making a political choice. That a political choice is defensible on
the basis (or partly on the basis) of a religious belief does not mean
that the choice is not also defensible on a nonreligious basis. Indeed,
one or another political choice that some citizens might make on a
religious basis might be made by other citizens on a nonreligious
basis. The question is whether a citizen may make a political choice
that is not defensible on a nonreligious basis, a choice that cannot be
defended without relying on a religious belief that opponents of the
choice, or at least some of them, reject.4
It bears emphasis that that question is distinct from the question
whether a citizen may rely on a religious belief to make a "public"
political argument - an argument directed not just to the members
of a particular religious community, or to the members of any reli-
gious community within a particular range of communities, or just to
citizens who consider themselves religious, but to all citizens, includ-
ing those who do not consider themselves religious. It is true that
choices reject. Cf. Michael J. Perry, Is the Idea of Human Rights Ineliminably Reli-
gious?, in PARADOXES OF RIGHTS (Thomas Kearns & Austin Sarat eds., forthcoming
1994). But are there really such choices? If not, then an ideal of political choice in which
a citizen should not make a controversial political choice that cannot be defended without
relying on a religious belief that opponents of the choice reject is an ideal without practi-
cal import. Of course, one might contend for an ideal according to which a citizen should
not make a controversial political choice on a religious basis even if the choice can be
defended on a nonreligious basis. See infra note 4. But if, as I argue in this Article, we
ought not to accept the former ideal of political choice, afortiori we ought not to accept
the latter ideal.
3. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 66-82.
4. Robert Audi has defended, as a requirement of political choice, the requirement
of "an adequate secular rationale." He has also defended the requirement of "an ade-
quate secular motivation." See Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free
and Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 677. 691-97 (1993). If, as I argue in
part III of this Article, we should not accept anything like the requirement of an ade-
quate secular rationale, afortiori we should not accept the requirement of an adequate
secular motivation.
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strategic considerations may counsel a religious citizen to make her
appeal on a nonreligious basis, if one is available. 5 But there is no
reason to doubt that, as a matter of ideal American political moral-
ity, she may forsake strategic considerations and make her appeal on
a religious basis.
Even if people are exposed in argument to ideas over which they are bound
to disagree - and how could any doctrine of public deliberation preclude
that? - it does not follow that such exposure is pointless or oppressive. For
one thing, it is important for people to be acquainted with the views that
others hold. Even more important, however, is the possibility that my own
view may be improved, in its subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion
or a metaphysics that I am initially inclined to reject. . . . I mean to draw
attention to an experience we all have at one time or another, of having
argued with someone whose world view was quite at odds with our own, and
of having come away thinking, "I'm sure he's wrong, and I can't follow
much of it, but, still, it makes you think . . . ." The prospect of losing that
sort of effect in public discourse is, frankly, frightening - terrifying, even,
if we are to imagine it being replaced by a form of "deliberation" that, in
the name of "fairness" or "reasonableness" (or worse still, "balance") con-
sists of bland appeals to harmless nostrums that are accepted without ques-
tion on all sides. That is to imagine open-ended public debate reduced to
the formal trivia of American televisions networks.6
The serious question is not whether a citizen may rely on a religious
belief in making a public political argument. The question worth
taking seriously is whether, when the time for choice (and not
merely argument) is at hand, she may make a political choice that
cannot be defended without relying on one or more religious beliefs
that at least some citizens who oppose the choice reject.
There are variations on this question about the ideal of political
choice we Americans should accept. For example: Should we accept
an ideal according to which a citizen may not make a political choice
that cannot be defended without relying on a religious belief that
5. Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Limits of the Involvement of Religion in the Body Poli-
tic, in THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 191, 213 (James E.
Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1991):
[T]he distinction between principle and prudence should be emphasized. The
fundamental question is not whether, as a matter of prudent judgment in a
religiously pluralist society, those who hold particular religious views ought to
cast their arguments in secular terms. Even an outsider can say that the answer
to that question is clearly, 'Yes, most of the time,' for only such a course is
likely to be successful overall.
Id. Tushnet is wrong to imply - though perhaps I overread him here - that the princi-
pal point of a public political argument is always to persuade. Sometimes the principal
point, if not often the only point, of a particular public political argument, especially one
based on religious convictions, is simply to bear witness.
6. Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 817, 841-42 (1993).
(some) opponents of the choice reasonably reject?7 Another varia-
tion: Should we accept an ideal according to which a citizen may not
make a coercive political choice - a choice requiring or forbidding
someone to do something - that cannot be defended without relying
on a religious belief that (some of) those who would be coerced by
the choice, and who oppose it, reject? Still another variation: Should
we accept an ideal according to which a citizen may not make a
political choice of a certain sort (for example, what Charles
Larmore has called "the determination of the principles of political
association") that cannot be defended without relying on a religious
belief that opponents of the choice reject?8 The differences among
these questions are not important for present purposes: The argu-
ments I make in this essay are applicable to each of the variations.
A further clarification is in order. The inquiry here is not about
what citizens should be legally permitted to do: permitted to do as a
matter of constitutional (or other) law. Rather, the inquiry is about
what, within the confines of what they are, or should be legally per-
mitted to do, citizens should do as a matter of political morality. To
say that, as a matter of politicaj morality, citizens should be legally
permitted to do something (e.g., use racial epithets) is not to say
that, as a matter of morality, political or otherwise, they should do
it.9
A principal occasion of the inquiry in this Article is the religious
pluralism of American society, which, as John Courtney Murray ob-
served, is congenital: "As it arose in America, the problem of plural-
ism was unique in the modern world, chiefly because pluralism was
the native condition of American society. It was not, as in Europe
7. Cf. LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 729 (1993). What does it mean to say that someone "reasonably" rejects a
belief (claim, proposition, etc.)? Given a holistic account of justification, whether a per-
son or a group "reasonably" rejects a belief depends on what else the person or the group
believes.
The proviso that the rejection be reasonable does not diminish the extent to which the
ideal limits political choice. After all, what rejection of a religious belief is not reasona-
ble in the context of contemporary American society, where many people reject religion?
8. Charles Larmore has said, in correspondence, that although citizens may, and
indeed should be encouraged to, base public political argument on "controversial ideas of
the good," including ideas that are religiously-based, when the time comes for political
choice of a certain sort (what he calls "the determination of the principles of political
association") they should make only those choices that can be justified on the basis of,
"not simply. . . the beliefs the other happens to have, but . . . the beliefs he has on the
assumption (perhaps counterfactual) that he too affirms the norm of equal respect." I
argue, in part II of this Article, that there is no good reason to accept a limitation of the
kind Larmore recommends. For an elaboration of Larmore's position, see his Political
Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339 (1990).
9. See Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 2061, 2063 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY. LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE
OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)).
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and England, the result of a disruption or decay of a previously exis-
tent religious unity."'1 The religious pluralism of contemporary
American society inheres not only in the fact that among the great
majority of Americans who consider themselves religious there is sig-
nificant dissensus about many basic religious beliefs, but also in the
fact that today many Americans do not consider themselves
religious.
Against the background of the congenital religious pluralism of
American society, it perhaps bears emphasis that nothing in this Ar-
ticle is meant to challenge the political-moral proposition, to some
extent represented by the First Amendment provisions protecting re-
ligious liberty, I" that some religious matters are beyond the legiti-
mate jurisdiction of government to regulate. (Precisely which
religious matters are beyond government's legitimate jurisdiction is a
matter of controversy. 12) The question addressed in this Article is
whether, with respect to choices within the legitimate jurisdiction of
government to make, we should accept an ideal of political choice
according to which political choices may not be made that cannot be
defended without relying on religious beliefs.
II. THE NEUTRALIST IDEAL OF POLITICAL CHOICE
I want to begin by considering an ideal of political choice - the
"neutralist" ideal according to which a political choice may not be
made that cannot be defended without relying on moral beliefs,
whether religiously-based or not, that at least some opponents of the
choice reject. (Variations on this ideal exist, but, as before, the vari-
ations are not important for present purposes.)
By a "moral" belief, I mean a belief about how it is good or fitting
for human beings, whether some human beings or all human beings,
to live their lives. (Of course, we're talking here about morality, not
medicine. Our present concern is not biological well-being, but so-
cial. 3) In the language of the "right" rather than in that of the
"good," I also mean a belief about how it is right for some or all
human beings to live their lives. It would be a mistake to put any
weight on the difference between discourse about "the good" and
10. See JOHN C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 27 (1960).
11. See infra note 64.
12. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
13. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL ES-
SAY 11, 214 n.16 (1988).
discourse about "the right," because, for present purposes, any dif-
ference between "good-talk" and "right-talk" is irrelevant. 14
Should we Americans accept the neutralist ideal of political
choice? The ideal is "neutralist" in that it purports to exclude, as a
sole basis for a political choice (that is, as a basis when no other
basis is available) not just some controversial moral beliefs - for
example, those with a religious content or those that have a religious
basis - but all such beliefs. (By a "controversial" belief, I mean
controversial in the context of American society, and not just mar-
ginally controversial, but centrally.) The neutralist ideal of political
choice has been prominent in recent American political theory:
Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, Charles Larmore and Thomas
Nagel have all, at one time or another, in one version or another,
defended the neutralist ideal.
15
One defect of the neutralist ideal is so large as to destroy whatever
appeal the ideal might otherwise have had: The ideal is impossibly
restrictive. Beliefs about human good that are admissible under the
neutralist ideal -beliefs that all citizens accept, or, at least, that
they cannot "reasonably" reject - underdetermine the resolution of
many of the political controversies that engage and divide us. The
resolution of many such controversies requires recourse to moral be-
liefs that are inadmissible under the neutralist ideal: beliefs about
14. See JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 221-22 (1980).
Of course, some moral beliefs are religious beliefs, too: moral beliefs whose content is
at least partly religious - e.g., "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God."
We should distinguish between the content of a moral belief being partly religious and
a basis of a moral belief being religious. (I am grateful to Robert Audi for emphasizing
this distinction to me.) Two persons, one of whom considers herself religious, the other of
whom does not, can share a moral belief. If a nonreligious person shares a moral belief
with a religious person, presumably the belief does not have a religious content. Nonethe-
less, if a reason why the religious person embraces the shared moral belief is that she
embraces a religious belief that (in her view) supports the moral belief, then for her the
moral belief has a religious basis even though for the nonreligious person it does
not-indeed, even if for the religious person the moral belief also has an independent
nonreligious basis.
If, as it seems, many shared moral beliefs (shared both by persons who consider them-
selves religious and by those who do not) are relatively indeterminate, a serious question
arises about how much, or what, is really shared. In any event, the possibility that we
Americans can resolve all or even many of the basic political controversies that engage
and divide us solely on the basis of shared moral beliefs is very doubtful, given the inde-
terminacy of many shared moral beliefs.
15. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980);
Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY (Stuart Hampshire
ed., 1978); Larmore, supra note 8; Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legiti-
macy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 (1987). I have commented critically on Ackerman and
Dworkin (and on a neutralist construal of John Rawls' work). See PERRY, supra note 13,
at 57-73. I have also commented critically on Ackerman and Nagel (and on a non-neu-
tralist construal of Rawls). See PERRY, supra note I, at 8-28.
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human good that many citizens (reasonably) reject. Kent Greena-
walt has persuasively developed the point.
16
Another problem significantly diminishes the appeal the neutralist
ideal might have had (for some) at first glance: The neutralist ideal
of political choice, despite occasional pretensions to the contrary, is
not itself neutral or impartial - as I explained in Love and Power.
1
7
Steven Smith has captured the core point with this amusing tale:
[T]he common denominator argument is fraudulent. Suppose Dad and
Daughter are discussing what to have for dinner. Daughter proposes: "Let's
just have dessert." Dad suggests that it would be better to have a full meal,
with salad, meat, fruit, cooked vegetables, and then dessert. Daughter re-
sponds: "Obviously, Dad, we disagree about a lot of things. But there is one
thing we agree on; we both want dessert. Clearly the fair and democratic
solution is to accept what we agree on. So let's just have dessert." Although
he might admire Daughter's cleverness, Dad is not likely to be taken in by
this common denominator ploy. The argument that secular public discourse
provides a common denominator that all citizens share is comparably clever
- and equally unpersuasive. 18
Given that the neutralist ideal of political choice is impossibly re-
strictive and is not itself neutral, why would anyone be tempted to
accept it? Let's consider several reasons why some have been
tempted - or, at least, why one might be tempted - to accept the
neutralist ideal.
1. The "noncognitivist" reason: Questions about human good are
not amenable to rational inquiry.
The neutralist ideal is an answer to a question about human good:
"According to what ideal of political choice is it good for us to live
our political lives?" Even if, for the sake of argument, we were to
credit the noncognitivist reason, it would not support the neutralist
ideal; rather, the noncognitivist reason tells us that the question to
which the neutralist ideal is an answer is not amenable to rational
inquiry.
Moreover, we should not credit the noncognitivist reason: Ques-
tions about human good are infinitely various, or virtually so; that no
such question is amenable to rational inquiry is wildly implausible.
Some such questions surely are.
2. The "pluralist" reason: To every question about human good
that is amenable to rational inquiry, there are at least two answers
16. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
(1988).
17. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 10, 14-15, 147 n.9.
18. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the 'Secular. Reconstructing the Disestab-
lishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1010 (1989).
that are (a) either equally reasonable, in the sense that the ways of
life recommended by the answers are equally good or fitting ways
for the human beings in question to live their lives, or (b) incom-
mensurable, in the sense that the ways recommended by the answers
are incommensurable.1 9
This proposition does not seem to support the neutralist ideal of
political choice, as my colleague Stephen Gardbaum has argued,
with particular reference to incommensurability:
Incommensurability does not generally appear to require political neutral-
ity .... [C]onflicts between competing values often arise that have no one
rational outcome, and yet the state is not required to remain neutral among
them. For example, the following pairs all represent political and economic
values or goals about whose priority reasonable people can disagree: eco-
nomic growth and conservation of natural resources, specialization and self-
sufficiency, current and future consumption, expenditure on space explora-
tion and welfare programs. Yet incommensurability does not compel state
neutrality in these instances. To the contrary, the competition between
these values and goals constitutes the very substance of politics.20
If a political majority may legitimately "prioritize" between or
among such incommensurable values, why may it not legitimately do
so between the incommensurable ways of life recommended by com-
peting answers to questions about human good?
Moreover, it is implausible that to every question about human
good amenable to rational inquiry there are at least two answers ei-
ther equally reasonable or incommensurable. We may safely assume
that to some such questions there are at least two answers either
equally reasonable or incommensurable, but that is a far cry from
saying that every answer to those questions is, in relation to every
other answer, either equally reasonable or incommensurable.
3. The "respect" reason: It necessarily denies to a person the re-
spect due her as a fellow citizen - or as a 'free and equal" person,
or simply as a human being -for government to coerce her on the
basis of beliefs about human good that she rejects (or "reasonably"
rejects).
Of course, not every contested political choice is coercive. 21 But
the neutralist ideal may be proffered as an ideal not of political
choice generally, but of coercive political choice. Nonetheless, the
argument from respect is deeply problematic, as William Galston
and others have explained:
[Charles] Larmore (and Ronald Dworkin before him) may well be right
19. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322 (1986) ("A and B are
incommensurate if it is neither true that one is better than the other nor true that they
are of equal value.").
20. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals Af-
ter All, 104 HARv. L, REV. 1350, 1361 (1991).
21. See id. at 1366-67.
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that the norm of equal respect for persons is close to the core of contempo-
rary liberalism. But while the (general) concept of equal respect may be
relatively noncontroversial, the (specific) conception surely is not. To treat
an individual as person rather than object is to offer him an explanation.
Fine; but what kind of explanation? Larmore seems to suggest that a prop-
erly respectful explanation must appeal to beliefs already held by one's in-
terlocutors; whence the need for neutral dialogue. This seems arbitrary and
implausible. I would suggest, rather, that we show others respect when we
offer them, as explanation, what we take to be our best reasons for acting as
we do.
For example, when we arrest, try, and convict criminals, we show respect
for their moral personality by offering the reasons embedded in the
law. . . . The convicted criminal may reject each and every one of these
premises. He or she may suffer from a sociopathic disconnection from all
other human beings and from society at large. But we do not explain our
actions to the criminal on the basis of his or her own beliefs. Indeed, to do
so would be insulting and manipulative. We rather show respect by treating
the criminal as we would anyone else, as someone capable of acting in ac-
cordance with a sound understanding of justice and of being motivated by a
sense of justice.2
Of course, Galston would have to allow that it is never to show equal
respect to a person for one to offer to another - for example, as for
a Nazi to offer to a Jew - a reason to the effect that "you have an
inferior nature," even if the Nazi sincerely believes that to be his
best reason for acting as he does."
4. The "practical" reason: The practical costs of government co-
ercing persons on the basis of beliefs about human good they reject
22. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 109 (1991). As Gerald Dworkin has
concluded, in criticism of Ronald Dworkin: "There is a gap between a premise which
requires the state to show equal concern and respect for all its citizens and a conclusion
which rules out as legitimate grounds for coercion the fact that a majority believes that
conduct is immoral, wicked, or wrong. That gap has yet to be closed." Gerald Dworkin,
Equal Respect and the Enforcement of Morality, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 180, 193
(1990). See also FINNIS, supra note 14, at 221-22 (criticizing Ronald Dworkin).
23. I am grateful to Charles Larmore for this point.
Galston's critique seems to me to survive, though his example of the criminal sociopath
is no longer apt, when we understand that Larmore's point is that (as Larmore has put it
in correspondence) the "justification [for political choices of a certain sort; see supra note
8] must appeal, not simply to the beliefs that the other happens to have, but to the
beliefs he has on the assumption (perhaps counterfactual) that he affirms the norm of
equal respect." The force of Galston's position is undiminished: "[W]e show others re-
spect when we offer them, as explanation, what we take to be out best reasons for acting
as we do" - so long as our reasons do not themselves assert or imply the inferior hu-
manity of those to whom the explanation is offered. GALSTON, supra note 22, at 109.
Because the moral ideal of equal respect, which is central to Larmore's theory, is contro-
versial, perhaps it is misleading to label Larmore's theory (and similar theories), which is
exclusivist, "neutralist." On the distinction between exclusivism and neutralism (which is
the extreme version of exclusivism), see part III of this Article. Nothing of substance
turns on this essentially terminological matter.
(or "reasonably" reject), costs in the form of human suffering, polit-
ical divisiveness and instability, are always too high.
The "always" here is implausible: "Whether coercion is justified
must be determined contextually, depending on such factors as the
ideals in question, what is at stake, the consequences of acting or not
acting in a given situation, and the amount of coercion involved. '24
I want to emphasize, with respect to my rejection of the two pre-
ceding reasons, that in Love and Power I developed several reasons
why, in the spirit of liberalism-as-tolerance, as distinct from liber-
alism-as-neutrality, we should be wary about pursuing coercive polit-
ical strategies.25 Nothing in this Article is a call to relax that
wariness.
I have given one important reason for rejecting the neutralist ideal
of political choice: it is impossibly restrictive. I have also noted that
the ideal is not itself neutral or impartial. Finally, I have explained
why four reasons for accepting the ideal simply do not work.
None of this is to deny that government can, and sometimes
should, be neutral between (or among) some competing positions -
such as, competing positions about the nature of God. However, such
neutrality is not neutral between all competing positions in the
neighborhood - for example, the position supporting such neutrality
and the position opposing it. Note, moreover, that no neutral justifi-
cation of such neutrality may be available; it may not be possible to
defend such neutrality without relying on controversial moral beliefs.
III. ExCLUSIVIST IDEALS OF POLITICAL CHOICE
The neutralist ideal of political choice is an exclusivist ideal. In-
deed, it is the extreme version of an exclusivist ideal: It excludes, as
a (sole) basis for a political choice, not just some controversial moral
beliefs, but all such beliefs. To reject, at the one extreme, the neu-
tralist ideal is not necessarily to accept, at the other extreme, the
inclusivist ideal, according to which neither controversial beliefs
about human good nor even supporting religious beliefs are excluded.
Is there an appealing middle ground? Should we Americans reject
both the neutralist ideal and the inclusivist ideal and instead accept
24. Gardbaum, supra note 20, at 1367-69. Gardbaum adds:
Within liberal societies, the amount of coercion generally involved in promoting
such 'domestic' moral ideals as autonomy, equality, and human dignity is not
always great, and often much less than that involved in importing 'foreign'
ideals into a previously homogeneous moral culture. The model of the Bolshe-
vik Party implanting and fostering the value of communism on Czarist Russia
should not tyrannize our minds on this issue.
Id. at 1369.
25. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 128-38.
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an exclusivist ideal of political choice according to which some be-
liefs, whether controversial moral beliefs or supporting beliefs, are
excluded?
Although I argued in Love and Power that we should reject the
neutralist ideal of political choice, I defended an exclusivist ideal of
the middle ground. In particular, I argued that some controversial
beliefs should be excluded as a basis for a public political argu-
ment:26 any moral belief, or any supporting belief (whether religious
or not), that fails what I called "the standard of public
accessibility." 27
I now see that we Americans should not accept any exclusivist
ideal, either of public political argument or of political choice - not
even any "middle ground" ideal. Instead, we should accept the in-
clusivist ideal, according to which neither any controversial moral
belief nor supporting belief - including (and this is what I want to
emphasize here) any supporting religious belief - is excluded. This
includes any supporting religious belief. There is no good reason to
accept any middle ground exclusivist ideal. In particular, there is no
good reason to exclude religious beliefs - religious beliefs that, in
the view of those who embrace them, support controversial moral
beliefs - as a basis for a political choice even when no other basis is
available.
26. I was focused in Love and Power much more on public political argument than
on political choice.
27. See Michael J. Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
599, 604 (1992):
A defense of a disputed position abides the standard of public accessibility if it
is neither authoritarian nor sectarian. A defense of a disputed position is au-
thoritarian if and to the extent it relies on the authority of persons or institu-
tions that have little if any authority beyond the confines of one's own
particular religious or other moral community. A defense of a disputed position
is sectarian if and to the extent it relies on a claim of epistemological privilege
that has little if any authority beyond the confines of one's own particular reli-
gious or other moral community. By "a claim of epistemological privilege" I
mean a claim to the effect that my religious or other moral community has a
way of gaining access to religious or other moral truth that is superior to that
of other human beings and other human communities. A defense of a disputed
position seems to be sectarian - it seems to rely on a claim of epistemological
privilege - if and to the extent the position is put forward as more than the
reflective yield of the lived experience of an historically extended community
of fallible, broken human beings struggling to discern what it means to live a
truly, fully human life.
Id. For an earlier formulation, see PERRY, supra note 1, at 106. For a discussion, see id.
at 105-11.
1. Political choices that cannot be defended without relying on re-
ligious beliefs do not invariably deny to those who reject (or "reason-
ably" reject) the beliefs the respect due them as fellow citizens, as
"free and equal" persons, or simply as human beings. As a basis for
a political choice, controversial religious beliefs are neither more nor
less problematic in that regard than are controversial nonreligious
beliefs. As I argued earlier, controversial beliefs of neither kind (as a
basis for a political choice when no other basis is available) can plau-
sibly be understood necessarily to deny such respect. 28
This is not to deny that some sectarian rationales, whether reli-
gious or not, can deny to some persons the respect due them: for
example, arguments that assert or imply that those persons are, be-
cause of their race, religion, or sex, not fully human. Nor is it to
deny that, as Ken Karst has argued, some styles of religious politics
(styles that embody religious intolerance, religious triumphalism, or
the like) can deny to some of our fellow citizens the respect that is
their due.29 But I do mean to deny that every style of religious polit-
ics necessarily does so. In particular, political choices that cannot be
defended without relying on religious beliefs do not necessarily deny
to any of our fellow citizens the respect due them.
2. Even as a sole basis for a political choice, religious beliefs are
not, in our context, invariably divisive or, much less, destabilizing:
Although some imaginable instances of choosing on the basis of reli-
gious beliefs might, in conjunction with other factors, precipitate po-
litical instability, as a general matter, "the risk of major instability
generated by religious conflict is minimal. Conditions in modern de-
mocracies may be so far from the conditions that gave rise to the
religious wars of the sixteenth century that we no longer need worry
about religious divisiveness as a source of substantial social con-
flict."30 Our experience with our present practice (which, after all, is
inclusivist)3' certainly seems confirmatory. (Or does someone want
to argue that the sky really is falling - or is about to?) In the
28. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
29. See Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Government, and
the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1992).
30. Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1096
(1990). Solum is stating the argument, not making it. Indeed, Solum is wary of the
argument. See id. at 1096-97. Solum cites, as an instance of the argument, Stephen L.
Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 932, 939 (1989). For
another instance, see Maimon Schwarzschild, Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal
Society: Always Oil and Water, or Sometimes More Like Rum and Coca-Cola?, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 903, 910-14 (1993); see also Charles Larmore, Beyond Religion and
Enlightenment, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 799, 801 (1993); cf. MURRAY, supra note 10, at
23-24 (counselling wariness about "project[ing] into the future of the Republic the night-
mares, real or fancied, of the past").
31. See Levinson, supra note 9, at 2062-63, nn.8, 11. A recent collection contains
several essays detailing our traditionally inclusivist practice: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN
THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5.
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United States and elsewhere in the First World, religion has been
domesticated (at least for the most part). We are not the former
Yugoslavia or India.3 2 An ideal of political choice forged in the cru-
cible of a time or place very different from our own, or forged in our
own time and place but to meet the exigencies of a time or place
very different from our own, is scarcely an American ideal. Kent
Greenawalt's admonition is relevant: "[W]e need to acknowledge
that what principles of restraint, if any, are appropriate may depend
on time and place, on a sense of present realities within a society, of
its history and of its likely evolution."33
3. Religious beliefs do not have a different, much less inferior,
epistemological status from that of other beliefs, a status that makes
them less appropriate than other beliefs as a basis for a political
choice. That is, if we have any religious beliefs, we do not come to
them differently, nor do we justify them differently (if we try to jus-
tify them), than we do many of our nonreligious beliefs (in particu-
lar, our beliefs about ultimate, or "limit," questions34). Larry
Alexander has recently developed the point at length; it is enough,
here, to incorporate Alexander's discussion by reference.3 "
A variation on the argument under discussion here could be used
to support a different exclusivist ideal, one that does not trade on the
religious/secular distinction: "Some beliefs-both some religious be-
liefs and some secular beliefs-have a different epistemological sta-
tus from that of other beliefs, a status that makes them less
appropriate as grounds of political choice." Thomas Nagel once
made an argument to that effect" but, under assault from Joseph
Raz,37 he has abandoned it.38 Further examples are the argument of
Robert Audi, who allows for the possibility that some secular beliefs,
and not just religious beliefs, are "esoteric,"3 9 and the argument of
32. See Amartya Sen, The Threats to Secular India, N.Y. REv., Apr. 8, 1993, at
26.
33. GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 59.
34. On "limit" questions, see PERRY, supra note 1, at 71-72.
35. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763 (1993); see also Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of
Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1990).
36. See Nagel, supra note 15.
37. See Raz, supra note 35, at 31-46.
38. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 151 n.28.
39. See Audi, supra note 4, at 690: "[I]f [in addition to religious reason] there is
secular reason which is esoteric in a sense implying that a normal rational person lacks
access to it, then a stronger requirement is needed; one might thus speak of public rea-
son, as Rawls and others do." (What is "a normal rational person?") In correspondence,
Audi has written that he uses "'esoteric' in the classical sense implying intelligibility to
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Kent Greenawalt, who insists that some religious and some nonreli-
gious beliefs are "nonaccessible."40 My argument in Love and Power
is yet another example.41 Alexander's powerful argument for "the
unity of epistemology" is an adequate response, in my view, to any
exclusivist position, whether or not the position trades on the reli-
gious/secular distinction that presupposes the "disunity" of episte-
mology - that presupposes, that is, that some beliefs, in particular
some moral beliefs or some bases for moral beliefs, have a different
epistemological status ("esoteric," "nonaccessible," etc.) that makes
them inappropriate as bases of political choice. (Alexander's argu-
ment, although it "focus[es] on the relation between liberalism and
religion[,] . . . extends beyond religion and encompasses all views of
the Good that have implications for public policy."' 42)
(Of course, some religious persons (though not all) may insist that
some religious beliefs do have a different and privileged epistemolog-
ical status (e.g., "revealed by God"). Some who do so insist may
want to argue that because of their privileged epistemological status,
such beliefs are unsuited to be a basis for political choice in a society
like ours.4 3 But the nonreligious persons who contend for an ex-
clusivist ideal of political choice (e.g., Ackerman and Nagel) cannot
acquiesce in the claim that religious beliefs have a privileged episte-
mological status. Therefore, they cannot join the argument that, be-
cause of their privileged epistemological status, such beliefs are
unsuited as a basis for political choice.)
In addition to the absence of good reasons for accepting any mid-
dle-ground exclusivist ideal of political choice, there is this reason for
rejecting any such ideal. By privileging some controversial moral be-
liefs, or some controversial bases for controversial moral beliefs, and
de-privileging others, any exclusivist ideal of the middle ground inev-
itably creates two classes of citizenship: Those citizens all, or virtu-
ally all, of whose most basic such beliefs are privileged are "first
an initiated group." He adds that in the quoted passage, he "was taking account of the
possibility that the secular may be esoteric, and not asserting that secular beliefs some-
times are: I do, as you say, allow for this, but wasn't gesturing toward any particular
items." Letter from Robert Audi to Michael Perry (Aug. 14, 1992) (on file with author).
40. See Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for Political Judgment: The Status of Per-
sonal Experience and the Autonomy and Generality of Principles of Restraint, 30 SAN
DEGO L. REv. 647 (1993).
For a critical comment on Greenawalt's discussion of the nonaccessibility of religious
belief and experience, see David Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion:
Civil Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 877, 896-97 (1993).
41. See PERRY, supra note 1.
42. Alexander, supra note 35, at 4.
43. See, e.g., Audi, supra note 4; cf. Richard Neuhaus, Reason Public and Pri-
vate: The Pannenberg Project, FIRST THINGS, Mar., 1992, at 55, 57 ("So long as Chris-
tian teaching claims to be a privileged form of discourse that is exempt from the scrutiny
of critical reason, it will understandably be denied a place in discussions that are authen-
tically public.").
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class" citizens; those citizens some of whose most basic such beliefs
are de-privileged are relegated to "second class" citizenship.
4
To accept the inclusivist ideal of political choice, as I now believe
we should, is not to deny that some religious beliefs represent bad
theology, or bad epistemology, or both: theology or epistemology that
misunderstands and therefore misrepresents how we fallible human
beings come to our beliefs, including our religious beliefs and our
moral beliefs. 5 But it is deeply misguided to construct an (ex-
clusivist) ideal of political choice purportedly for all of us Ameri-
cans, or even for most of us, partly on the basis of theological views,
or epistemological views, or both, that many Americans not only do
not embrace, but reject. After all, no ideal of political choice is an
ideal for all or most of us Americans that presupposes the superiority
of theological or epistemological views many of us (reasonably) con-
test. (As Greenawalt has emphasized, "One must present reasons for
the [proposed principle of restraint] that have appeal to persons of
religious and ethical views different from one's own. . .. ,,46) No
such ideal is part of any "overlapping consensus": No such ideal rep-
resents a point of convergence among the moral and religious world
views that divide us. No such ideal, therefore, is one that all or most
of us can and should accept, or that none of us can "reasonably"
reject.
In constructing an ideal of political choice for all or most of us
Americans, and not merely for some of us, it simply will not do to
privilege my (or our) controversial theological/epistemological views
and to de-privilege theirs (e.g., David Smolin's 47 ). It is one thing to
reject certain beliefs as theologically unsound, or epistemologically
unsound, or both, and, where it seems fitting to do so, to be willing to
challenge them as such. It is another thing altogether to suggest that
such beliefs may not serve as a basis for a political choice (may not,
that is, when no other basis is available). Relatedly, it is one thing to
44. For an elaboration and an anguished and angry crie de couer, see David Smo-
lin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Response
to Professor Perry, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1067 (1991) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE
AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)).
45. 1 quite agree with Dan Conkle's argument in a recent essay that "when reli-
gious believers exercise their rights in the political process, some religious arguments
have more to offer than others, and ... they accordingly are entitled to more attention
and public consideration." Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics:
Evaluating the Role of Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law,
10 J. L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 1994).
46. GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at 53.
47. See Smolin, supra note 44.
say to a David Smolin, "Although your arguments, no less than
mine, may serve as a (sole) basis for political choice, this is why I
reject your arguments and think others should too." It is another
thing to say, "I don't even have to try to meet your arguments on the
merits, because, unlike mine, they may not serve as a basis for politi-
cal choice." As Smolin has aptly responded to such a claim: "If
Perry's ideals of dialogue are merely his personal religious ideals,
why should they govern those who hold differing religious ideals?" 48
Let me emphasize again that in Love and Power I developed sev-
eral reasons why, in the spirit of liberalism-as-tolerance, as distinct
from liberalism-as-neutrality, we should be wary about pursuing co-
ercive political strategies. That we should reject any exclusivist ideal
of political choice (including any exclusivist ideal of the middle
ground) does not mean that those of us of a mind to do so may not
press for a state of affairs in which, for the most part,49 law and
policy (especially coercive laws and policies) not only do not contra-
dict the existing public consensus,50 but are grounded in such a con-
sensus. Many of us - some who consider ourselves religious, others
of who do not - believe that there is good reason to press for such a
tolerant state of affairs: Absent such a consensus, the practical costs
of some coercive laws and policies may be, in a society as morally
and religiously pluralistic as ours, prohibitive.51 That we should re-
ject any exclusivist ideal of political choice does not mean that those
of us of a mind to do so may not concur in David Hollenbach's argu-
ment, which I accept, that the proper role of religious discourse "in
public" (especially in a democratic society as morally and religiously
pluralistic as ours) is mainly a role to be played much more in public
culture than in public argument specifically about political issues: to
help build a public consensus about what kind of people "We the
people" should aspire to be,52 - with what values, commitments,
48. Smolin, supra note 44, at 1084. (Cf. id.: "Perhaps Perry's theory is really no
more than an account of his religious faith shapes his political participation, rather than
a general ideal applicable to all Americans.") See Filomen D'Agostino, The Idea and the
Ideal of Public Justification, 18 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 143, 158 (1992):
To settle on a particular conception of public justification, it is therefore neces-
sary to settle questions, at least to our own satisfaction, which are themselves
properly political questions. The project of public justification therefore cannot
be beyond or prior to politics itself. It is not a meta-political project, as some
might have wishfully thought; it is, rather, itself a part of the realm of properly
political argumentation.
Id.
49. In particular, where human rights are not imperiled.
50. Of course, if there is anything approaching a public consensus about some is-
sue, it is extremely unlikely in a democratic society like ours that any law or policy can
survive that opposes it.
51. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 128-38.
52. The Constitution of the United States begins: "We the people of the United
States. .. ."
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sensibilities.5"
There is no tension between, on the one hand, pressing for a toler-
ant state of affairs (and concurring in Hollenbach's argument) and,
on the other hand, saying that we should reject an ideal of political
choice that excludes religious beliefs as a (sole) basis for political
choice. Indeed, in the view of some of us who consider ourselves reli-
gious, it may not be possible to defend, or fully defend, those politi-
cal choices conducive to, or even constitutive of, "a tolerant state of
affairs" without relying on certain religious beliefs.54 In any event, it
is one thing (and wrong) to say that a particular political choice
should not be made because it cannot be defended without relying on
religious beliefs that opponents of the choice reject (or "reasonably"
reject). It is another thing altogether to say that a particular politi-
cal choice - perhaps one that cannot be defended without relying
on religious beliefs that opponents of the choice reject - should not
be made because the reasons opposing the choice (which may even
be religious reasons) are stronger than the reasons supporting it.
Nothing in this Article calls into question an argument of the latter
sort.
As I said, although I defended a middle-ground exclusivist ideal of
political choice in Love and Power, I now think that we should reject
even any middle-ground exclusivist ideal and instead accept the in-
clusivist ideal. But much of the constructive argument of Love and
Power survives, albeit not as an argument for a middle-ground ex-
clusivist ideal. It survives as an argument - incomplete, to be sure
- for a particular understanding of how we fallible, broken human
beings come to have many of the various and often competiting reli-
gious beliefs and moral beliefs we do and, especially, of how we
should bring those beliefs to bear in public political argument.55 Of
53. See Hollenbach supra, note 40, at 897.
54. Consider, in that regard, Reinhold Niebuhr's theological and historical com-
ments on the religious basis of democratic toleration. See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE
CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS 135-37 (1944).
55. On how we come to have some - not all, but some - of the beliefs we do, this
statement by James Burtchaell is suggestive (though, obviously, much more needs to be
said):
The Catholic tradition embraces a long effort to uncover the truth about
human behavior and experience. Our judgments of good and evil focus on
whether a certain course of action will make a human being grow and mature
and flourish, or whether it will make a person withered, estranged and indiffer-
ent. In making our evaluations, we have little to draw on except our own and
our forebears' experience, and whatever wisdom we can wring from our debate
with others. ..
What we are trying to unpuzzle are things like childbearing and immigration
course, there's not much time - or, if time, occasion - for theologi-
cal or epistemological discourse in public political argument. But
that there is not much time does not mean there is no time. Public
political argument can include, after all, articles, books, op-ed pieces,
and so forth.
One ought not to think that religious discourse about the difficult
moral issues that engage and divide us is necessarily more problem-
atic - more interminable, say, or more dogmatic - than resolutely
secular discourse about those issues. David Tracy has lamented that
"[f]or however often the word is bandied about, dialogue remains a
and economic policy and infant mortality and drug use and family fidelity and
so much else about which we must frame moral judgments. With our fellow
communicants we share commitments and assumptions: that we are happier
giving than getting, that there is no greater love than to put down your life for
your neighbor, and that your neighbor always turns out to be the most unlikely
person.
James Burtchaell, The Source of Conscience, 13 NOTRE DAME MAG. 20, 20-21 (Winter
1984-85). (On our neighbor always turning out to be the most unlikely person, see Luke
10:29-37 (Parable of the Good Samaritan)). Burtchaell continues:
Nothing is specifically Christian about this method of making judgments about
human experience. That is why it is strange to call any of our moral convic-
tions "religious," let alone sectarian, since they arise from a dialogue that
ranges through so many communities and draws from so many sources. And
when debate and dialogue and testimony do fructify into conviction, and con-
viction into consensus, nothing could be more absurd than to expect that con-
sensus to be confined within a person's privacy or a church's walls. Convictions
are what we live by. Do we have anything better to share with one another?
Burtchaell, supra at 21. (For a revised version of Burtchaell's essay, and for several other
illuminating essays by Father Burtchaell, see JAMES BURTCHAELL, THE GIVING AND
TAKING OF LIFE (1989)); cf Basil Mitchell, Should Law Be Christian?, 96/97 L. &
JUST.. 12. 20-21 (1988):
But, the objection may be pressed, can a religious body argue its case in a
secular forum (i.e., one that is not already antecedently committed to the reli-
gion in question)? Either, it may be said, it will rely on Christian premises,
which ex hypothesi opponents will not accept; or it will employ purely secular
premises, in which case the ensuing law will not be Christian. In neither case
will any genuine debate have taken place between Christians and non-Chris-
tians. The dichotomy, however, is altogether too neat to be convincing. It pre-
supposes that there is and always must be a complete discontinuity between
Christian and secular reasoning. Certainly this can occur - if, for example,
the Christian is an extreme fundamentalist and the secular thinker regards in-
dividual preferences as the sole basis for morality. But in the sort of Western
society we have in mind, the moral intuitions of those who are not religiously
committed have been influenced by centuries of Christianity, and the mainline
Christian churches have for sometime been at pains to take account of develop-
ments in the human sciences and in the humanities which bear upon the inter-
pretation of Christian doctrine. In a period during which the narrowness of the
official churches has often driven genuinely Christian developments into other
channels, it is not in fact all that easy to determine which ideas are of purely
secular origin. But, these cultural reflections apart, Christians would presuma-
bly want to argue (at least, many of them would) that the Christian revelation
does not" require us to interpret the nature of man in ways for which there is
otherwise no warrant but rather affords a deeper understanding of man as he
essentially is. If that is so, there is room for a genuine exchange of ideas.
Id.
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rare phenomenon in anyone's experience. Dialogue demands the in-
tellectual, moral, and, at the limit, religious ability to struggle to
hear another and to respond. To respond critically, and even suspi-
ciously when necessary, but to respond only in dialogical relationship
to a real, not a projected other."' 56 Given the religious illiteracy
-and, alas, even prejudice - rampant among many secular aca-
demics, 57 it perhaps bears emphasis that at its best religious dis-
course in public culture is not less dialogic (it is not less open, less
deliberative, less productive) than, at its best, secular discourse in
public culture. (The work of David Hollenbach, for example, is illus-
trative.") Nor, at its worst, is religious discourse more monologic
(more closed, more dogmatic, more sterile) than, at its worst, secular
56. DAVID TRACY, DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER 4 (1990). Steven Smith, com-
menting wryly that " 'dialogue' seems to have become the all-purpose elixir of our time,"
has suggested that "[t]he hard question is not whether people should talk, but rather
what they should say and what (among the various ideas communicated) they should
believe." Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 434-35
(1990). As David Tracy's observation suggests, however, there is yet another "hard"
question, which Smith's suggestion tends to obscure: Not whether but how people should
talk; what qualities of character and mind should they bring, or try to bring, to the task.
57. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 67, 142-43, 173 n.l.
58. See Hollenbach, supra note 40. Hollenbach writes:
For example, the Catholic tradition provides some noteworthy evidence that
discourse across the boundaries of diverse communities is both possible and
potentially fruitful when it is pursued seriously. This tradition, in its better
moments, has experienced considerable success in efforts to bridge the divisions
that have separated it from other communities with other understandings of
the good life. In the first and second centuries, the early Christian community
moved from being a small Palestinian sect to active encounter with the Helle-
nistic and Roman worlds. In the fourth century, Augustine brought biblical
faith into dialogue with Stoic and Neoplatonic thought. His efforts profoundly
transformed both Christian and Graeco-Roman thought and practice. In the
thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas once again transformed Western Christi-
anity by appropriating ideas from Aristotle that he had learned from Arab
Muslims and from Jews. In the process he also transformed Aristotelian ways
of thinking in fundamental ways. Not the least important of these transforma-
tions was his insistence that the political life of a people is not the highest
realization of the good of which they are capable-an insight that lies at the
root of constitutional theories of limited government. And though the church
resisted the liberal discovery of modern freedoms though much of the modern
period, liberalism has been transforming Catholicism once again through the
last half of our own century. The memory of these events in social and intellec-
tual history as well as the experience of the Catholic Church since the Second
Vatican Council leads me to hope that communities holding different visions of
the good life can get somewhere if they are willing to risk conversation and
argument about these visions. Injecting such hope back into the public life of
the United States would be a signal achievement. Today, it appears to be not
only desirable but necessary.
Id, at 891.
discourse.59 (An important feature of Hollenbach's work is his argu-
ment, which I noted earlier, that the proper role of "public" religious
discourse in a society as morally and religiously pluralistic as ours
(helping to build a public consensus about the kind of people "We
the people" should aspire to be) is a role to be played much more in
public culture than in public argument specifically about political is-
sues. He writes: "[T]he domains of government and policy-formation
are not generally the appropriate ones in which to argue contro-
verted theological and philosophical issues [nonetheless,] it is ...
neither possible nor desirable to construct an airtight barrier be-
tween politics and culture. ' 60 )
It is important to remember, of course, that religious discourse in
the public square can be quite sectarian and, therefore, divisive.
(When it is, then, given America's religious pluralism, it is also al-
most certainly ineffectual."1 ) But it is important to remember, too -
especially for many of us in the secular academy - that religious
discourse in the American public square is not necessarily more sec-
tarian than is much secular discourse. Indeed, it can be much less
sectarian. After all, certain basic moral premises common to the
Christian and Jewish traditions, in conjunction with the supporting
religious premises, still constitute the fundamental moral horizon of
most Americans (much more so than do Kantian (or neo-Kantian)
premises, or Nietzschean premises,6 2 or Epicurean premises, and so
forth) .63
59. I recommend doubters begin by consulting, in addition to Hollenbach's work,
Robin Lovin's work. See, e.g., Robin Lovin, Perry, Naturalism, and Religion in Public,
63 TUL. L. REV. 1517 (1989).
60. Hollenbach, supra note 40, at 900. See also GREENAWALT, supra note 16, at
1034 (expressing skepticism about "the promise of religious perspectives being trans-
formed in what is primarily political debate").
61. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
62. Richard Taylor embraces Nietzschean premises in his Ancient Wisdom and
Modern Folly, 13 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 54 (1988).
63. Cf. JURGEN HABERMAS. POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING: PHILOSOPHICAL ES-
SAYS 15 (William M. Hohengarten trans., 1992):
I do not believe that we, as Europeans, can seriously understand concepts like
morality and ethical life, person and individuality, of freedom and emancipa-
tion, without appropriating the substance of the Judeo-Christian understanding
of history in terms of salvation. And these concepts are, perhaps, nearer to our
hearts than the conceptual resources of Platonic thought, centering on order
and revolving around the cathartic intuition of ideas. Others begin from other
traditions to find the way to the plenitude of meaning involved in concepts such
as these, which structures our self-understanding. But without the transmission
through socialization and the transformation through philosophy of any one of
the great world religions, this semantic potential could one day become inacces-
sible. If the remnant of the intersubjectively shared self-understanding that
makes human(e) intercourse with one another possible is not to disintegrate,
this potential must be mastered anew by every generation.
Id.
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One might challenge the inclusivist ideal of political choice as in-
consistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,64
as presently interpreted by the Supreme Court.65 But that challenge
- even if, for the sake of argument, we credit it66 - is largely be-
side the point. The fundamental political-theoretical question that
engages us is not, What ideal of political choice should we accept,
given the Court's present interpretation of the Establishment
Clause? Rather, the question is, What ideal of political choice
should we accept? If there is an inconsistency between the ideal we
should accept and the Court's present interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause, so much the worse, as a matter of political theory, for
the Court's present interpretation of the clause. Indeed, if there is an
inconsistency between the ideal we should accept and the clause
rightly interpreted (whatever the right interpretation might be), so
much the worse for the clause rightly interpreted. Of course, given
the indeterminacy of the Establishment Clause, it is likely that a
Supreme Court justice's answer to the political-theoretical question
of the ideal of political choice we should accept will influence his or
her answer to the constitutional-legal question of the meaning of the
clause.67
IV. AN ExCLUSIVIST IDEAL FOR LEGISLATORS, AT LEAST - OR
FOR JUDGES?
Should we Americans insist that legislators, at least, not make
political choices that cannot be defended without relying on religious
beliefs? It is difficult to see why we should, if we should not insist
that citizens not make such choices. I agree with Jeremy Waldron's
position, which I need not rehearse here, that it is a mistake, in this
context, to distinguish between citizens and legislators. 8 At least, it
is a mistake, in this context, to draw the distinction too sharply, or
64. The First Amendment forbids Congress - and the First Amendment in con-
junction with the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to forbid the states - to
"make [any] law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
65. For an example of such a challenge, see Edward B. Foley, Tillich and Camus,
Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 954, 957-59, 980-82 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J.
PERRY. LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (1991)); for another, see Levinson, supra note 9, at 2070-73.
66. 1 am not inclined to credit it. See PERRY, supra note 1, at 112-16. But then, I
do not profess to be an expert on establishment clause theory or jurisprudence.
67. See generally, MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW
OR POLITICS? chs. 4 & 5 (forthcoming 1994).
68. See Waldron, supra note 6, at 826-31.
put too much weight on the distinction.69
Should we insist that religious beliefs are an inappropriate basis
for judicial decision making (and, therefore, for judicial justifica-
tion) when no other basis is available - and perhaps even when
another basis is available? ° Theories of adjudication, perhaps espe-
cially theories of constitutional adjudication, are controversial. The
serious question is this: Is there any good reason for saying that a
judge, in the course of specifying - shaping - indeterminate legal
materials, may rely on one (or more) of her own, controversial moral
beliefs if the belief can be defended on a nonreligious basis but not if
it can be defended only on a religious basis? It is easy to see why one
might think that judges should not rely on their own, controversial
moral beliefs.7 1 But it is difficult to see why, if one thinks that a
69. For an impressive argument that it does not make sense to distinguish between
the grounds on which citizens may rely, in making political choices, and the grounds on
which their elected representatives may rely, see Tushnet, supra note 5, at 199-201.
70. For relevant discussions, see SOLUM, supra note 7; James L. Buckley, The
Catholic Public Servant, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1992, at 18; Carter, supra note 30, at 932;
Scott C. Idleman, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND.
L.J. 433 (1993); Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Reli-
gion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047 (1990); Thomas Shaffer, On
Checking the Artifacts of Canaan: A Comment on Levinson's "Confrontation," 39
DEPAUL L. REv. 1133 (1990); Howard J. Vogel, The Judicial Oath and the American
Creed: Comments on Sanford Levinson's The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil
Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1107 (1990).
71. Not that that is my view. To the contrary. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CON-
STITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? (forthcoming 1994). In that book I
explain:
The heart of the judge's responsibility, of course, is to decide on the basis of
"legal" premises, if there are any relevant legal premises: premises authorita-
tive for her qua judge. Assuming that the relevant legal premises do not con-
clude the question, it seems fitting for a judge to decide on the basis of
premises that, although not authoritative for her qua judge, are nonetheless the
object of widespread consensus in American society - even, -perhaps, part of
the society's "common sense" - unless the consensus/common sense is, in her
view, either contrary to legal premises or mistaken; conversely, it seems prob-
lematic for her to decide on the basis of premises widely rejected in American
society. According to Justice Brennan, "[E]ven high court judges are con-
strained in issuing rulings[,] . . . not just by precedent and the texts they are
interpreting, but also, on any attractive political and jurisprudential theory, by
a decent regard for public opinion . .. ."
Assuming, however, that legal premises and/or consensual/commonsensical
premises, even if they rule out some answers to the "how best to achieve the
value question", do not yield a single answer, presumably she should decide on
the basis of premises she accepts, premises authoritative for her qua the partic-
ular person she is - unless, of course, an axiomatic (for the political-legal
culture) norm about judicial role requires her to forsake reliance on one or
more premises she accepts (or unless one or more premises she accepts is
widely rejected in American society). What sense would it make to suggest
that when legal premises and consensual/commonsensical premises do not to-
gether yield an answer, a judge should decide on the basis of premises she
rejects, premises not authoritative for her qua the particular person she is? (To
say that an axiomatic norm about judicial role may require her to rely on one
or more premises she rejects is just to say that one or more premises she rejects
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judge may rely on her own, controversial moral beliefs if the beliefs
can be defended on a nonreligious, but nonetheless controversial, ba-
sis, one should not also think that she may do so even if the beliefs
can be defended only on a religious basis. Why, in the context of
adjudication, should the controversial secular basis of a controversial
moral belief be privileged and the controversial religious basis of a
controversial moral belief be de-privileged? I suspect that the argu-
ments one might be inclined to try at this point are the very argu-
ments rehearsed, and found wanting, earlier in this essay. 2
may be authoritative for her qua judge - that, in other words, one or more
such premises may be legal premises.) As U. S. Circuit Judge James L. Buck-
ley has written, in an essay titled "The Catholic Public Servant": "When faced
with ambiguities, or with problems that fall within the interstices that inevita-
bly exist within and between laws, a judge is necessarily called upon to exercise
a large measure of discretion. In doing so, he will inevitably bring to that task
everything that he is - the books he has read; his experience as spouse, parent,
and public official; his understanding of the nature of man and the responsibili-
ties of citizenship; his sense of justice; even his sense of humor. A judge is not a
machine, and the judicial function cannot be displaced by a formula or mea-
sured by an equation." To say, as I did a moment ago, that a judge should not
rely on premises widely rejected in American society is not to say that she
should never rely on premises not widely accepted in American society; it is not
to say that she should "never be the first person to bring a new value, a new
political or ethical insight, into the law." As Justice Brennan has said, "High
court judges interpreting a bill of rights may at times lead public opinion."
Justice Brennan quickly added, however, that "in a democratic society they
cannot do so often, or by very much."
Id. at 98-99 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original).
72. None of this is to suggest that the judge is a "moral philosopher". See Wal-
dron, supra note 6, at 833:
[A] point will come a point in judicial decision making when the judge must
simply make a moral judgment of his own, in his own voice, the best way he
knows how. He does not eo ipso become a moral philosopher, unless we extend
the latter category to cover anyone who tries to think hard about moral
problems. It makes more sense to adjust the categories from the other direc-
tion: moral and political philosophers are simply doing systematically, profes-
sionally, and at leisure what judges and other officials must do under a deadline
every day. Neither activity - neither that of the philosopher nor that of the
judge - differs, in essence, from the thinking and decision making of the ordi-
nary person addressing matters of civic importance. For all three, there comes
a time when he must think about and enter a value judgment in his own voice.
Unless he does that, he will not be able to complete the task assigned to him,
whether it is teaching, interpreting legal sources, or choosing for whom to vote.
Once we acknowledge the unavoidable place of moral judgment in the activity
of the judge, we must recognize that he is pro tanto in the same game as the
ordinary citizen so anything appropriate for the citizen to take into account in
exercising his political power is appropriate for the judge and for other officials
to take into account, to the extent that they face moral choices in the exercise
of theirs.
Id.
I hope I am not misunderstood at this point. To suggest that in the
context of adjudication there is no good reason to privilege the con-
troversial secular basis of a controversial moral belief over the con-
troversial religious basis of a controversial moral belief is not to
suggest that judges, either in deciding difficult cases or in justifying
their decisions, should often or blithely rely on controversial moral
beliefs or on controversial beliefs, religious or secular, that support
controversial moral beliefs. Even when, in the "hard" case, there
may be no apparent alternative for a judge to give a controversial
moral belief as an element of her defense - her justification - of
her decision,7 3 my suggestion is not that she also give the controver-
sial belief (perhaps religious) that in her view supports the contro-
versial moral belief, much less that she undertake a theological or
philosophical defense of the supporting belief. To adapt a point I
made earlier: That we should reject any exclusivist ideal of political
choice, even for legislators and judges, does not mean that those of
us of a mind to do so may not conclude that the proper role of reli-
gious or philosophical discourse "in public," especially in a demo-
cratic society as morally and religiously pluralistic as ours, is mainly
a role to be played much more in public culture than in public argu-
ment specifically about political or legal issues, including argument
by legislators and judges acting in their official capacities. I do so
conclude - and I concur, therefore, in David Hollenbach's admoni-
tion: "I do not think it would be helpful for two judges, one a liberal
Catholic and the other a conservative Protestant, to launch into epis-
temological and theological reasoning to explain why their responses
to a piece of legislation regarding abortion [for example] are differ-
ent. These theological and epistemological differences are better
dealt with in the discussions that take place in the sphere I have
called cultural, not that of the political sphere conceived narrowly as
the judiciary or the legislature." '74
V. CONCLUSION
Let me try, a final time, to forestall the misunderstanding that
seems almost inevitable in discussions of religion and politics. To re-
ject, as I have argued here we should, any exclusivist ideal of politi-
cal choice is not to deny any of the following four premises: Indeed,
as I have indicated at various points in this essay, I affirm each of
the premises:
1. The proper role of religious discourse "in public" is a role to be
73. See supra note 71.
74. Hollenbach, supra note 40, at 899-900. The analysis and conclusion of a recent
article, which came to my attention after I had completed this Article, are substantially
congruent with my own. See Idleman, supra note 70.
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played much more in public culture than in public argument specifi-
cally about political issues.
2. Some religious claims represent bad theology and should therefore
be rejected.
3. Our politics and law should aspire to be tolerant of moral and
religious differences rather than "moralistic."
4. Some styles of religious participation in politics - those that fail
the test of civility - represent bad citizenship.
It is one thing to construct, as Lawrence Solum has impressively
done elsewhere in this Symposium, an exclusivist ideal of political
choice. (Solum calls it "an ideal of public reason. '75) It is another
thing altogether to make the case that we should accept such an
ideal. It does not seem to me that the case has yet been made. A
careful statement of credible reasons for any such ideal is much
needed, in my view. I have tried to indicate in this Article why I find
some of the most often given reasons (e.g., showing others the re-
spect due them as free and equal persons) either ill-conceived or too
thin to bear the weight put on them. One hopes that John Rawls'
new book, Political Liberalism,6 will significantly advance the
discussion.
75. See SOLUM, supra note 7.
76. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).

